Page:Jones v. Hendrix.pdf/18

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Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023)

13

Opinion of the Court

clause that, if accepted, would convert §2255(e) into a license for unbounded error correction. He argues that §2255 is necessarily “inadequate or ineffective to test” a prisoner’s claim if the §2255 court fails to apply the correct substantive law. This argument ignores that the saving clause is concerned with the adequacy or effectiveness of the remedial vehicle (“the remedy by motion”), not any court’s asserted errors of law. Cf. Swain v. Pressley, 430 U. S. 372, 383 (1977) (holding a District of Columbia-court remedy modeled on §2255 not to be “ ‘inadequate or ineffective’ ” because the D. C. courts were “competent to decide all issues”). Even when “circuit law is inadequate or deficient” because a Court of Appeals’ precedents have resolved a legal issue incorrectly, that is not a fault in “the §2255 remedial vehicle” itself.^[1] Prost, 636 F. 3d, at 590.

Next, Jones offers a wide-ranging discussion of the concept of “inadequacy” as a term of art in traditional equity jurisprudence. While Jones demonstrates that courts of equity would afford relief from “inadequate” legal remedies in

↑ Despite occasional gestures in its direction, and despite its critical role in persuading the Courts of Appeals to expand the saving clause, Jones’ textual arguments place relatively little emphasis on whether binding precedent foreclosed a prisoner’s statutory argument at trial, on appeal, and in an initial §2255 motion. See In re Davenport, 147 F. 3d 605, 610–611 (CA7 1998) (making such foreclosure an express precondition of saving-clause relief); see also Triestman v. United States, 124 F. 3d 361, 380 (CA2 1997) (emphasizing that the prisoner “had no [prior] effective opportunity to raise his [Bailey] claim”); In re Dorsainvil, 119 F. 3d 245, 251 (CA3 1997) (similar). Rather, under Jones’ interpretation of “test,” it appears that §2241 would be available to correct any asserted error of law by a §2255 court, even on an issue of first impression. Untenable as that consequence is, the erroneous-foreclosure approach fares no better. To hold that binding precedent renders a judicial proceeding “ ‘inadequate or ineffective’ to test the rights of parties” would be a shock for “our entire justice system,” in which “precedent is ubiquitous.” Wright v. Spaulding, 939 F. 3d 695, 709 (CA6 2019) (Thapar, J., concurring). Nothing in the text or history of the saving clause suggests that it uniquely embodies that far-reaching proposition.

[1] Despite occasional gestures in its direction, and despite its critical role in persuading the Courts of Appeals to expand the saving clause, Jones’ textual arguments place relatively little emphasis on whether binding precedent foreclosed a prisoner’s statutory argument at trial, on appeal, and in an initial §2255 motion. See In re Davenport, 147 F. 3d 605, 610–611 (CA7 1998) (making such foreclosure an express precondition of saving-clause relief); see also Triestman v. United States, 124 F. 3d 361, 380 (CA2 1997) (emphasizing that the prisoner “had no [prior] effective opportunity to raise his [Bailey] claim”); In re Dorsainvil, 119 F. 3d 245, 251 (CA3 1997) (similar). Rather, under Jones’ interpretation of “test,” it appears that §2241 would be available to correct any asserted error of law by a §2255 court, even on an issue of first impression. Untenable as that consequence is, the erroneous-foreclosure approach fares no better. To hold that binding precedent renders a judicial proceeding “ ‘inadequate or ineffective’ to test the rights of parties” would be a shock for “our entire justice system,” in which “precedent is ubiquitous.” Wright v. Spaulding, 939 F. 3d 695, 709 (CA6 2019) (Thapar, J., concurring). Nothing in the text or history of the saving clause suggests that it uniquely embodies that far-reaching proposition.

[1]