Opinion of the Court
until 1974, in Davis, that the Court broke with that tradition, holding for the first time that a substantive error of statutory law could be a cognizable ground for a collateral attack on a federal court’s criminal judgment. See 417 U. S., at 342–347.
The Suspension Clause does not constitutionalize that innovation of nearly two centuries later. Nor, a fortiori, does it require the extension of that innovation to a second or successive collateral attack.
Jones’ remaining constitutional arguments are no more persuasive. He argues that denying him a new opportunity for collateral review of his Rehaif claim threatens separation-of-powers principles—specifically, Congress’ exclusive power to define crimes Cf. United States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch 32, 34 (1812). But the authority to determine the facts and the law in an individual case, and to render a final, binding judgment based on those determinations, stands at the core of the judicial power. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U. S. 211, 218–219 (1995); Watkins, 3 Pet., at 202–203. A court does not usurp legislative power simply by misinterpreting the law in a given case. See id., at 206 (“If its judgment was erroneous, a point which this court does not determine, still it is a judgment”).
pretrial orders of commitment on the ground that there was “not sufficient evidence … to justify [their] commitment on the charge of treason.” Id., at 135. Matter of Corryell, 22 Cal. 178 (1863), granted relief from a pretrial order of commitment after holding that the acts of which the petitioner stood accused did not constitute the charged crime. Id., at 180, 183. (Incidentally, this use of habeas was not free from controversy. See, e.g., In re Hacker, 73 F. 464, 465–469 (SD Cal. 1896); “In re Kearney,” The Writ of Habeas Corpus—Its Uses and Abuses, 5 Pac. Coast L. J. 549, 565–570 (1880).) Finally, In re Wahll, 42 F. 822 (D. Minn. 1890), considered but rejected a similar argument for ordering pretrial release. Id., at 824–826. In sum, like Jones’ pre-founding English cases, the dissent’s 19th-century American cases include no example in which a prisoner under sentence of a court of general criminal jurisdiction was permitted to relitigate the elements of his offense on habeas corpus.
