Syllabus
(2) The Government asks the Court to adopt a novel interpretation of §2255(e)’s saving clause based on an elaborate argument. Starting from the premise that the words “inadequate or ineffective” imply reference to a “benchmark” of adequacy and effectiveness, the Government equates that benchmark with the types of claims cognizable in federal habeas petitions by state prisoners under the general habeas statutes. The Government ultimately concludes that §2255(h) renders §2255 “inadequate or ineffective to test” a federal prisoner’s statutory claim in cases where the prisoner has already filed one §2255 motion and the claim otherwise satisfies pre-AEDPA habeas principles, which generally will require “a ‘colorable showing of factual innocence.’ ” McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U. S. 467, 495 (quoting Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U. S. 436, 454 (plurality opinion)).
The Court sees no indication that the saving clause adopts the Government’s state-prisoner-habeas benchmark. In any event, that benchmark has uncertain relevance to the question presented here because federal habeas relief does not lie for errors of state law. The Government’s theory ultimately rests instead on its assertion that §2255(h) is simply not clear enough to support the inference that Congress entirely closed the door on pure statutory claims not brought in a federal prisoner’s initial §2255 motion. That assertion is unpersuasive.
The Government asserts that the Court must require “the clearest command” before construing AEDPA to “close [the] courthouse doors” on “a strong equitable claim” for relief. Holland v. Florida, 560 U. S. 631, 646, 649 (internal quotation marks omitted). But AEDPA’s restrictions embody Congress’s policy judgment regarding the appropriate balance between finality and error correction. The Court declines to adopt a presumption against finality. Further, the Court typically has found clear-statement rules appropriate when a statute implicates historically or constitutionally grounded norms that the Court would not expect Congress to unsettle lightly. See, e.g., Alabama Assn. of Realtors v. Department of Health and Human Servs., 594 U. S. ___, ___ (per curiam). As far as history and the Constitution are concerned, “there is nothing incongruous about a system in which this kind of error—the application of a since-rejected statutory interpretation—cannot be remedied after final judgment,” George v. McDonough, 596 U. S. ___, ___, and thus nothing fundamentally surprising about Congress declining to make such errors remediable in a second or successive collateral attack. Pp. 20–25.
8 F. 4th 683, affirmed.
