Jackson, J., dissenting
and thereby eschew statutory interpretations that would (perhaps unintentionally) foreclose judicial review of postconviction claims, even where the text of the statute might (sometimes even strongly) suggest otherwise.[1]
Furthermore, and significantly for present purposes, we have already determined that the necessary “clear statement” here—i.e., the signal from Congress that justifies reading a statute as foreclosing access to venerated postconviction review processes—cannot be derived from negative inferences drawn from statutory text. In Ex parte Yerger, for instance, we declared that interpreting a statute to “[r]epea[l] by implication” habeas jurisdiction is “not favored.” 8 Wall., at 105. More recently, we warned (again) that “[i]mplications from statutory text or legislative history are not sufficient to repeal habeas jurisdiction; instead, Congress must articulate specific and unambiguous statutory directives to effect a repeal.” St. Cyr, 533 U. S., at 299 (citing Ex parte Yerger, 8 Wall., at 105). And, again, in Holland, this Court explained that the clear-statement rule
- ↑ For example, we cited the clear-statement rule when declining to read §2244(b)(2), which generally prohibits second or successive habeas petitions filed by state prisoners, as blocking a second-in-time habeas petition that raised an incompetent-to-be-executed claim, even though, literally read, the statute could have done so. Panetti, 551 U. S., at 942–943, 945–946. Similarly, in Holland, the Court relied on the clear-statement rule when evaluating AEDPA’s 1-year statute of limitations, holding that the unequivocal statutory limitations period can be equitably tolled, even though the text of AEDPA did not include equitable tolling among the enumerated exceptions. 560 U. S., at 646–649. Likewise, in Castro, the Court used the clear-statement rule to reject the argument that §2244(b)(3)(E)—which prohibits habeas petitioners from seeking certiorari review of a “ ‘grant or denial of an authorization by a court of appeals to file a second or successive application’ ”—prevented this Court from reviewing whether the lower courts had mistakenly concluded that the federal prisoner’s petition was in fact a “second or successive” petition. 540 U. S., at 379–381. Finally, in St. Cyr, the Court utilized the clear-statement rule to dispense with the contention that AEDPA stripped federal courts of jurisdiction to review a noncitizen’s habeas petition raising a pure question of law. 533 U. S., at 298–299, 314.
