Page:Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (1st ed, 1833, vol I).djvu/330

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CONSTITUTION OF THE U. STATES.

[BOOK III.

§ 322. If this be the true interpretation of the instrument, it has wholly failed to express the intentions of its framers, and brings back, or at least may bring back, upon us all the evils of the old confederation, from which we were supposed to have had a safe deliverance. For the power to operate upon individuals, instead of operating merely on states, is of little consequence, though yielded by the constitution, if that power is to depend for its exercise upon the continual consent of all the members upon every emergency. We have already seen, that the framers of the instrument contemplated no such dependence. Even under the confederation it was deemed a gross heresy to maintain, that a party to a compact has a right to revoke that compact; and the possibility of a question of this nature was deemed to prove the necessity of laying the foundations of our national government deeper, than in the mere sanction of delegated authority.^[1] "A compact between independent sovereigns, founded on acts of legislative authority, can pretend to no higher validity, than a league or treaty between the parties. It is an established doctrine on the subject of treaties, that all the articles are mutually conditions of each other; that a breach of any one article is a breach of the whole treaty; and that a breach committed by either of the parties absolves the others, and authorizes them, if they please, to pronounce the compact violated and void."^[2] Consequences like these, which place the dissolution

↑ The Federalist, No. 92; Id. No. 43; see also Mr. Patterson's Opinion in the Convention, 4 Elliot's Debates, 74, 75; and Yates's Minutes.
↑ The Federalist, No. 43.—Mr. Madison, in the Virginia Report of January 1800, asserts, (p. 6, 7,) that "the states being parties to the constitutional compact, and in their sovereign capacity, it follows of necessity, that there can be no tribunal above their authority to decide in the last resort, whether the compact made by them be violated; and conse-

[1] The Federalist, No. 92; Id. No. 43; see also Mr. Patterson's Opinion in the Convention, 4 Elliot's Debates, 74, 75; and Yates's Minutes.

[s322n2-2] The Federalist, No. 43.—Mr. Madison, in the Virginia Report of January 1800, asserts, (p. 6, 7,) that "the states being parties to the constitutional compact, and in their sovereign capacity, it follows of necessity, that there can be no tribunal above their authority to decide in the last resort, whether the compact made by them be violated; and conse-

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