the rights, and redress the wrongs of the whole community. In such cases the doctrine prevails, inter leges silent arma. But the reverse maxim would prevail upon the doctrine, of which we are speaking, inter arma silent leges. It is plain, that such a resort is not contemplated by any of our forms of government, by a suit of one citizen against the whole for a redress of his grievances, or for a specific performance of the obligations of the constitution. He may have, and doubtless in our forms of administering justice has, a complete protection of his rights secured by the constitution, when they are invaded by any other citizen. But that is in a suit by one citizen against another; and not against the body politic, upon the notion of contract.
§ 335. It is easy, also, to understand, how compacts between independent nations are to be construed, and violations of them redressed. Nations, in their sovereign character, are all upon an equality; and do not acknowledge any superior, by whose decrees they are bound, or to whose opinions they are obedient. Whenever, therefore, any differences arise between them, as to the interpretation of a treaty, or of the breach of its terms, there is no common arbiter, whom they are bound to acknowledge, having authority to decide them. There are but three modes, in which these differences can be adjusted; first, by new negotiations, embracing and settling the matters in dispute; secondly, by referring the same to some common arbitor, pro hac vice, whom they invest with such power; or thirdly, by a resort to arms, which is the ultima ratio regum, or the last appeal between sovereigns.
§ 336. It seems equally plain, that in our forms of government, the constitution cannot contemplate either of these modes of interpretation or redress. Each
