and not merely as a voluntary contract, entered into by parties capable of contracting, and binding themselves by such terms, as they choose to select.[1] If this be a correct view of the subject, it will enable us to enter upon the other parts of the proposed discussion with principles to guide us in the illustration of the controversy.
§ 350. In what light, then, is the constitution of the United States to be regarded? Is it a mere compact, treaty, or confederation of the states composing the Union, or of the people thereof, whereby each of the several states, and the people thereof, have respectively bound themselves to each other? Or is it a form of government, which, having been ratified by a majority of the people in all the states, is obligatory upon them, as the prescribed rule of conduct of the sovereign power, to the extent of its provisions?
§ 351. Let us consider, in the first place, whether it is to be deemed a compact? By this, we do not mean an act of solemn assent by the people to it, as a form of government, (of which there is no room for doubt;) but a contract imposing mutual obligations, and contemplating the permanent subsistence of parties having an independent right to construe, control, and judge of its obligations. If in this latter sense it is to be deemed a compact, it must be, either because it contains on its face stipulations to that effect, or because it is necessarily implied from the nature and objects of a frame of government.
§ 352. There is nowhere found upon the face of the constitution any clause, intimating it to be a compact, or in anywise providing for its interpretation, as such.- ↑ Heinecc. Elem. Juris. Natur. L. 2, ch. 6, § 109 to 112; 2 Turnbull's Heinecc. p. 95, &c.
