Page:Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (1st ed, 1833, vol I).djvu/402

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CONSTITUTION OF THE U. STATES.
[BOOK III.

nation and its members can only be properly referred to the national tribunal; that the peace of the whole ought not to be left at the disposal of a part; and that whatever practices may have a tendency to disturb the harmony of the states, are proper objects of federal superintendence and control.[1]

§ 390. The same doctrine was constantly avowed in the state conventions, called to ratify the constitution. With some persons it formed a strong objection to the constitution; with others it was deemed vital to its ex-
  1. In The Federalist, No. 78 and 82, the same course of reasoning is pursued, and the final nature of the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is largely insisted on. In the Convention of Connecticut. Mr. Ellsworth (afterwards Chief Justice of the United States) used the following language: "This constitution defines the extent of the powers of the general government. If the general legislature should at any time overleap their limits, the judicial department is the constitutional check. If the United States go beyond their powers; if they make a law, which the constitution does not authorize, it is void; and the judicial power, the natio ml judges, who, to secure their impartiality, are to be made independent, will declare it void. On the other hand, if the states go beyond their limits; if they make a law, which is a usurpation upon the general government, the law is void, and upright and independent judges will declare it. Still however, if the United States and the individual states will quarrel; if they want to fight, they may do it, and no frame of government can possibly prevent it." In the debates in the South Carolina legislature, when the subject of calling a convention to ratify or reject the constitution was before them,[a 1] Mr. Charles Pinckney (one of the members of the convention) avowed the doctrine in the strongest terms. "That a supreme federal jurisdiction was indispensable," said he, "cannot be denied. It is equally true, that in order to ensure the administration of justice, it was necessary to give all the powers, original as well as appellate, the constitution has enumerated. Without it we could not expect a due observance of treaties; that the state judiciaries would confine themselves within their proper sphere; or that a general sense of justice would pervade the Union, &c. That to ensure these, extensive authorities were necessary: particularly so, were they in a tribunal, constituted as this is, whose duty it would be, not only to decide all national questions, which should arise within the Union; but to control and keep the state judiciaries within their proper limits, whenever they should attempt to interfere with the power."
  1. Debates in 1733, printed by A. E. Miller, 1831, Charleston, p. 7.