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CONSTITUTION OF THE U. STATES.
[BOOK III.
commentary since made under a very different posture of feeling and opinion, an authority, which should operate an absolute limit upon the text, or should supersede its natural and just interpretation.
§ 407. Contemporary construction is properly resorted to, to illustrate, and confirm the text, to explain a doubtful phrase, or to expound an obscure clause; and in proportion to the uniformity and universality of that construction, and the known ability and talents of those, by whom it was given, is the credit, to which it is entitled. It can never abrogate the text; it can never fritter away its obvious sense; it can never narrow down its true limitations; it can never enlarge its natural boundaries.[1]- ↑ Mr. Jefferson has laid down two rules, which he deems perfect canons for the interpretation of the constitution.[a 1] The first is, "The capital and leading object of the constitution was, to leave with the states all authorities, which respected their own citizens only, and to transfer to the United States those, which respected citizens of foreign or other states; to make us several as to ourselves, but one as to ail others. In the latter case, then, constructions should lean to the general jurisdiction, if the words will bear it; and in favour of the states in the former, if possible, to be so construed." Now, the very theory, on which this canon is founded, is contradicted by the provisions of the constitution itself. In many instances authorities and powers are given, which respect citizens of the respective states, without reference to foreigners, or the citizens of other states.[a 2] But if this general theory were true, it would furnish no just rule of interpretation, since a particular clause might form an exception to it; and, indeed, every clause ought, at all events, to be construed according to its fair intent and objects, as disclosed in its language. What sort of a rule is that, which, without regard to the intent or objects of a particular clause, insists, that it shall, if possible, (not if reasonable) be construed in favour of the states, simply because it respects their citizens? The second canon is, "On every question of construction [we should] carry ourselves back to the time, when the constitution was adopted; recollect the spirit manifested in the debates; and instead of trying, what meaning may be squeezed out of the text, or invented against it, conform to the probable one, in which it was passed." Now, who does not see the utter looseness, and incoherence
