CH. V.]
RULES OF INTERPRETATION.
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guage to the same effect will be found in other judgments of the same tribunal.[1]
§ 423. If, then, we are to give a reasonable construction to this instrument, as a constitution of government established for the common good, we must threw aside all notions of subjecting it to a strict interpretation, as if it were subversive of the great, interests of society, or derogated from the inherent sovereignty of the people. And this will naturally lead us to some other rules properly belonging to the subject.
§ 424. V. Where the power is granted in general terms, the power is to be construed, as co-extensive with the terms, unless some clear restriction upon it is deducible from the context. We do not mean to assert, that it is necessary, that such restriction should be expressly found in the context. It will be sufficient, if it arise by necessary implication. But it is not sufficient to show, that there was, or might have been, a sound or probable motive to restrict it. A restriction founded on conjecture is wholly inadmissible. The reason is obvious: the text was adopted by the people in its obvious, and general sense. We have no means of knowing, that any particular gloss, short of this sense, was either contemplated, or approved by the people; and such a gloss might, though satisfactory in one state, have been the very ground of objection in another. It might have formed a motive to reject it in one, and to adopt it in another. The sense of a part of the people has no title to be deemed the sense of the whole. Motives of state policy, or state interest, may properly have influence in the question of ratifying it; but the constitution itself must be expounded, as it stands; and- ↑ See Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. R. 1, 187, &c. 222, &c.
