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CH. VII.]
DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS.
3
the executive, the legislative, and the judicial, among different functionaries, has been a favorite policy with patriots and statesmen. It has by many been deemed a maxim of vital importance, that these powers should forever be kept separate and distinct. And accordingly we find it laid down with emphatic care in the bill of rights of several of the state constitutions. In the constitution of Massachusetts, for example, it is declared, that
in the government of this commonwealth, the legislative department shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them; the executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them; the judicial shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them; to the end it may be a government of laws and not of men.[1]
Other declarations of a similar character are to be found in other state constitutions.[2]
§ 520. Montesquieu seems to have been the first, who, with a truly philosophical eye, surveyed the political truth involved in this maxim, in its full extent, and gave to it a paramount importance and value. As it is tacitly assumed, as a fundamental basis in the constitution of the United States, in the distribution of its powers, it may be worth inquiry, what is the true nature, object,
  1. ↑ Bill of Rights, article 30.
  2. ↑ The Federalist. No. 47.—It has been remarked by Mr. J. Adams, that the practicability or the duration of a republic, in which there is a governor, a senate, and a house of representatives, is doubted by Tacitus, though he admits the theory to be laudable. Cunctas nationes et urbes populus, aut priores, aut singuli regunt. Delecta ex his et constituta reipublicæ forma laudari facilius quam inveniri, vel si evenit, haud diuturna esse potest. Tacit. Ann. lib. 14. Cicero asserts, "Statuo esse optime constitutam rempublicam, quæ ex tribus generibus illis, regali, optimo, et populari, modice confusa." Cic. Frag. de Repub.[a 1] The British government perhaps answers more nearly to the form of government proposed by these writers, than what we in modern times should esteem strictly a republic.
  1. ↑ 1 Adams's Amer. Constitutions, Preface, 19.
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