CH. IX.]
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.
133
demonstrate the fallacy of the objection; for no one will pretend, that the rights and liberties of these states are not as well maintained, and as well understood by their senators and representatives, as those of any other states in the Union by theirs. There is yet one stronger case, that of Connecticut; for there one branch of the legislature is so constituted, that each member of it is elected by the whole state.[1]
§ 666. The remaining objection was, that there was no security, that the number of members would be augmented from time to time, as the progress of the population might demand.[2]
§ 667. It is obvious, that this objection is exclusively founded upon the supposition, that the people will be too corrupt, or too indifferent, to select proper representatives; or, that the representatives, when chosen, will totally disregard the true interests of their constituents, or willfully betray them. Either supposition (if the preceding remarks are well founded) is equally inadmissible. There are, however, some additional considerations, which are entitled to great weight. In the first place, it is observable, that the federal constitution will not suffer in comparison with the state constitutions in regard to the security, which is provided for a gradual augmentation of the number of representatives. In many of them the subject has been left to the discretion of the legislature; and experience has thus Air demonstrated not only, that the power is safely lodged, but that a gradual increase of representatives (where it could take place) has kept pace with that of the constituents.[3] In the next place, as a new census is to
