no small advantage, as to the means of influence and resistance. In the next place, the contest will not he to be decided merely by the votes of great states and small states, opposed to each other, but by states of intermediate sizes, approaching the two extremes by gradual advances. They will naturally arrange themselves on the one side, or the other, according to circumstances; and cannot be calculated upon, as identified permanently with either. Besides; in the new states, and those, whose population is advancing, whether they are great or small, there will be a constant tendency to favour augmentations of the representatives; and, indeed, the large states may compel it by making re-apportionments and augmentations mutual conditions of each other.[1] In the third place, the house of representatives will possess an exclusive power of proposing supplies for the support of government; or, in other words, it w ill hold the purse-strings of the nation. This must for ever give it a powerful influence in the operations of the government; and enable it effectually to redress every serious grievance.[2] The house of representatives will, at all times, have as deep an interest in maintaining the interests of the people, as the senate can have in maintaining that of the states.[3]
§ 669. Such is a brief view of the objections urged against this part of the constitution, and of the answers given to them. Time, as has been already intimated, has already settled them by its own irresistible demonstrations. But it is impossible to withhold our tribute of admiration from those enlightened statesmen, whosePage:Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (1st ed, 1833, vol II).djvu/143
CH. IX.]
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.
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