Page:Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (1st ed, 1833, vol II).djvu/160

commons elect their own speaker; but he must be approved by the king.^[1] This approval is now altogether a matter of course; but anciently, it seems, the king intimated his wish previously, in order to avoid the necessity of a refusal; and it was acceded to.^[2] The very language used by the speakers in former times, in order to procure the approval of the crown, was such as would not now be tolerated; and indicated, at least,

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Hampshire. But it will be said, 'this is giving more than one for 30,000.' True; but has it not been just said, that the one for 30,000 is prescribed only to fix the aggregate number, and that we are not to mind it when we come to apportion them among the states; that for this we must recur to the former rule, which distributes them according to the numbers in each state? Besides, does not the bill itself, apportion among seven of the states by the ratio of 27,770, which is much more than one for 30,000?
"Where a phrase is susceptible of two meanings, we ought certainly to adopt that which will bring upon us the fewest inconveniences. Let us weigh those resulting from both constructions.
"From that giving to each state a member for every 30,000 in that state, results the single inconvenience, that there may be large fractions unrepresented. But it being a mere hazard on which states this will fall, hazard will equalize it in the long run.
"From the other, results exactly the same inconvenience. A thousand cases may be imagined to prove it. Take one; suppose eight of the states had 45,000 inhabitants each, and the other seven 44,999 each, that is to say, each one less than each of the others, the aggregate would be 674,993, and the number of representatives, at one for 30,000 of the aggregate, would be 22. Then, after giving one member to each state, distribute the seven residuary members among the seven highest fractions; and, though the difference of population be only an unit, the representation would be the double. Here a single inhabitant the more would count as 30,000. Nor is this case imaginable only; it will resemble the real one, whenever the fractions happen to be pretty equal through the whole states. The numbers of our census happen, by accident, to give the fractions all very small or very great, so as to produce the strongest case of inequality that could possibly have occurred, and which may never occur again. The probability is, that the fractions will generally descend gradually from 39,999 to l. The inconvenience, then, of large unrepresented fractions attends both constructions; and,

1. 1 Black. Comm. 181.
2. Com. Dig. Parliament, E. 5; 4 Inst. 8, Lex. Parl. ch. 12, p. 74.