disposed to make towards extending its own power and influence in the government. Such a tendency is to be discovered in all bodies, however constituted, and to which no effectual check can be opposed, but frequent dissolutions and elections.[1] The truth of this remark may be admitted; but there are many circumstances, which may justly vary its force and application. While, on the one hand, perpetuity in a body may be objectionable, on the other hand, continual fluctuations may be no less so, with reference to its duties and functions, its powers, and its efficiency. There are dangers arising from too great frequency in elections, as well as from too small. The path of true wisdom is probably best attained by a moderation, which avoids either extreme. It may be said of too much jealousy, and of too much confidence, that, when either is too freely admitted into public councils, it betrays like treason.
§ 709. It seems paradoxical to assert, (as has been already intimated,) but it is theoretically, as well as practically true, that a deep-felt responsibility is incompatible with great frequency of elections.[2] Men can feel little interest in power, which slips away almost as soon, as it is grasped; and in measures, which they can scarcely do more than begin, without hoping to perfect. Few measures have an immediate and sensible operation, exactly according to their wisdom or policy. For the most part, they are dependent upon other measures, or upon time, and gradual intermixtures with the business of life, and the general institutions of society.[3] The first superficial view may shock popular prejudices, or errors; while the ultimate results may be as admira-Page:Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (1st ed, 1833, vol II).djvu/198
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CONSTITUTION OF THE U. STATES.
[BOOK III.
