CH. X.]
THE SENATE.
193
ments of deficient wisdom, hasty resolves, and still more hasty repeals? What are they, but admonitions to the people of the dangers of rash, and premature legislation,[1] of ignorance, that knows not its own mistakes, or of overweening confidence, which heeds not its own follies?
§ 712. A well constituted senate, then, which should interpose some restraints upon the sudden impulses of a more numerous branch, would, on this account, be of great value.[2] But its value would be incalculably increased by making its term of office such, that with moderate industry, talents, and devotion to the public service, its members could scarcely fail of having the reasonable information, which would guard them against gross errors, and the reasonable firmness, which would enable them to resist visionary speculations, and popular excitements. If public men know, that they may safely wait for the gradual action of a sound public opinion, to decide upon the merit of their actions and measures, before they can be struck down, they will be more ready to assume responsibility, and pretermit present popularity for future solid reputation.[3] If they are designed, by the very structure of the government, to secure the states against encroachments upon their rights and liberties, this very permanence of office adds new means to effectuate the object. Popular opinion may, perhaps, in its occasional extravagant sallies, at the instance of a fawning demagogue, or a favorite chief, incline to overleap the constitutional barriers, in ordervol. ii.25
