eration. Usurpations of power have been notoriously assumed by particular departments in each; and it has often happened, that these very usurpations have received popular favour and indulgence.[1]
§ 530. In the next place, in order to preserve in full vigour the constitutional barrier between each department, when they are entirely separated, it is obviously indispensable, that each should possess equally, and in the same degree, the means of self-protection. Now, in point of theory, this would be almost impracticable, if not impossible; and in point of fact, it is well known, that the means of self-protection in the different departments are immeasurably disproportionate. The judiciary is incomparably the weakest of either; and must for ever, in a considerable measure, be subjected to the legislative power. And the latter has, and must have, a controlling influence over the executive power, since it holds at its own command all the resources, by which a chief magistrate could make himself formidable. It possesses the power over the purse of the nation, and the property of the people. It can grant, or withhold supplies; it can levy, or withdraw taxes; it can unnerve the power of the sword by striking down the arm, which wields it.
§ 531. De Lolme has said, with great emphasis,- ↑ The Federalist, No. 48. See also The Federalist, No. 38, 42.
