important in the discharge of judicial duties, that they rarely carry with them any strong popular favour, or popular influence. The influence, if any, is of a different sort, arising from dignity of life and conduct, abstinence from political contests, exclusive devotion to the advancement of the law, and a firm administration of justice; circumstances, which are felt more by the profession, than they can be expected to be praised by the public.
§ 760. Besides; it ought not to be overlooked, that such an additional accumulation of power in the judicial department would not only furnish pretexts for clamour against it, but might create a general dread of its influence, which could hardly fail to disturb the salutary effects of its ordinary functions.[1] There is nothing, of which a free people are so apt to be jealous, as of the existence of political functions, and political checks, in those, who are not appointed by, and made directly responsible to themselves. The judicial tenure of office during good behaviour, though in some respects most favourable for an independent discharge of these functions and checks, is at the same time obnoxious to some strong objections, as a remedy for impeachable offences.
§ 761. There are, however, reasons of great weight, besides those, which have been already alluded to, which fully justify the conclusion, that the Supreme Court is not the most appropriate tribunal to be invested with authority to try impeachments.
§ 762. In the first place, the nature of the functions to be performed. The offences, to which the power of impeachment has been, and is ordinarily applied, as a remedy, are of a political character. Not but that- ↑ The Federalist, No. 65.
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