towards the judicial department, which may impair its general respect and daily utility?[1]
§ 767. Considerations of this sort cannot be overlooked in inquiries of this nature; and if to some minds they may not seem wholly satisfactory, they, at least, establish, that the Supreme Court is not a tribunal for the trial of impeachment, wholly above all reasonable exceptions. But if, to considerations of this sort, it is added, that the common practice of free governments, and especially of England, and of the states composing the Union, has been, to confide this powder to one department of the legislative body, upon the accusation of another; and that this has been found to work well, and to adjust itself to the public feelings and prejudices, to the dignity of the legislature, and to the tranquility of the state, the inference in its favour cannot but be greatly strengthened and confirmed.
§ 768. To those, who felt difficulties in confiding to the Supreme Court alone the trial of impeachments, the scheme might present itself, of uniting that court with the senate jointly for this purpose. To this union many of the objections already stated, and especially those, founded on the peculiar functions of the judicial department, would apply with the same force, as they do to vesting the Supreme Court with the exclusive jurisdiction. In some other respects there would result advantages from the union; but they would scarcely overbalance the disadvantages.[2] If the judges, compared with the whole body of the senate, were few in number, their weight would scarcely be felt in that body. The habits of co-operation in common daily duties
