ple, headed and directed by the state governments.[1] And what motive could there be, in congress, to produce such results? The very dissimilarity in the ingredients, composing the national government, forbid even the supposition of any effectual combination for such a purpose. The interests, the habits, the institutions, the local employments, the state of property, the genius, and the manners, of the people of the different states, are so various, and even opposite, that it would be impossible to bring a majority of either house to agree upon any plan of elections, which should favour any particular man, or class of men, in any state. In some states, commerce is, or may be, the predominant interest; in others, manufactures; in others, agriculture. Physical, as well as moral causes w ill necessarily nourish, in different states, different inclinations and propensities on all subjects of this sort. If there is any class, which is likely to have a predominant influence, it must be either the commercial, or the landed class. If either of these could acquire such an influence, it is infinitely more probable, that it would be acquired in the state, than in the national, councils.[2] In the latter, there will be such a mixture of all interests, that it will be impracticable to adopt any rule for all the states, giving any preference to classes or interests, founded upon sectional or personal considerations. What might suit a few states well, would find a general resistance from all the other states.
§ 819. If it is said, that the elections might be so managed, as to give a predominant influence to the wealthy, and the well-born, (as they are insidiously called,) the supposition is not less visionary. What possible mode is there to accomplish such a purpose?Page:Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (1st ed, 1833, vol II).djvu/294
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