CH. XI.]
ELECTIONS.
289
The truth is, that congress could never resort to a measure of this sort for purposes of oppression, or party triumph, until that body had ceased to represent the will of the states and the people; and if, under such circumstances, the members could still hold office, it would be, because a general and irremediable corruption, or indifference pervaded the whole community. No republican constitution could pretend to afford any remedy for such a state of things.[1]
§ 822. But why did not a similar objection occur against the state constitutions? The subject of elections, the time, place, and manner of holding them, is in many cases left entirely to legislative discretion. In New-York, the senators are chosen from four districts of great territorial extent, each comprehending several counties; and it is not defined, where the elections shall be had. Suppose the legislature should compel all the electors to come to one spot in the district, as, for instance, to Albany, the evil would be great; but the measure would not be unconstitutional.[2] Yet no one practically entertains the slightest dread of such legislation. In truth, all reasoning from such extreme possible cases is ill adapted to convince the judgment, though it may alarm our prejudices. Such a legislative discretion is not deemed an infirmity in the delegation of constitutional power. It is deemed safe, because it can never be used oppressively for any length of time,- ↑ 2 Elliot's Debates, 38, 39.
- ↑ The Federalist, No. 61.
the voters generally give their votes in the townships, where they reside. In the southern and western states, there are few towns, and the elections are held in the counties, where the population is sparse, and spread over large plantation districts.[a 1]
- ↑ 1 Elliot's Debates, 68.
vol. ii.37
