ple, as their constituents, it would have been at least some gain to have allowed them a seat, like territorial delegates, in the house of representatives, where they might freely debate without a title to vote. In such an event, their influence, whatever it would be, would be seen, and felt, and understood, and on that account would have involved little danger, and more searching jealousy and opposition; whereas, it is now secret and silent, and from that very cause may become overwhelming.
§ 867. One other reason in favour of such a right is, that it would compel the executive to make appointments for the high departments of government, not from personal or party favourites, but from statesmen of high public character, talents, experience, and elevated services; from statesmen, who had earned public favour, and could command public confidence. At present, gross incapacity may be concealed under official forms, and ignorance silently escape by shifting the labours upon more intelligent subordinates in office. The nation would be, on the other plan, better served; and the executive sustained by more masculine eloquence, as well as more liberal learning.
§ 868. In the British parliament no restrictions of the former sort exist, and few of the latter, except such as have been created by statute.[1] It is true, that an acceptance of any office under the crown is a vacation of a seat in parliament. This is wise; and secures the people from being betrayed by those, who hold office, and whom they do not choose to trust. But generally, they are re-eligible; and are entitled, if the people so choose, again to hold a seat in the house of commons,- ↑ See 1 Black. Comm. 175, 176.
