CH. VIII.]
THE LEGISLATURE.
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§ 547. The utility of a subdivision of the legislative power into different branches, having a negative upon each other, is, perhaps, at the present time admitted by most persons of sound reflection.
[1] But it has not always found general approbation; and is, even now, sometimes disputed by men of speculative ingenuity, and recluse habits. It has been justly observed, that there is scarcely in the whole science of politics a more important maxim, and one, which bears with greater influence upon the practical operations of government. It has been already stated, that Pennsylvania, in her first constitution, adopted the scheme of a single body, as the depositary of the legislative power, under the influence, as is understood, of a mind of a very high philosophical character.
[2] Georgia, also, is said in her first constitution, (since changed,) to have confided the whole legislative power to a single body.
[3] Vermont adopted the same course, giving, however, to the executive council a power of revision, and of proposing amendments, to which she yet adheres.
[4] We are also told by a distinguished statesman of great accuracy and learning, that at the first formation of our state constitutions, it was made a question of transcendent importance, and divided the opinions of our most eminent men. Legislation, being merely the expression of the will of the community, was thought to be an operation so simple in its nature, that inexperienced reason could not readily perceive the necessity of committing it to
- ↑ Jefferson's Notes on Virginia, 194; 1 Kent's Comm. 208; De Lolme on the Constitution of England. B. 2, ch. 3; 3 Amer. Museum, 62, 66, Gov. Randolph's Letter.
- ↑ 1 Adams's Defence of American Constitution, 105, 106; 2 Pitk. Hist. 294, 305, 316.
- ↑ 1 Kent's Comm. 208; 2 Pitk. Hist. 315.
- ↑ 2 Pitk. Hist. 314, 316; Const. of Vermont, 1793, ch. 2, § 2, 16.
