is true, that the defect of such an absolute negative has a tendency to weaken the executive department. But this may be obviated, or at least counterpoised, by other arrangements in the government; such as a qualified connection with the senate in making treaties and appointments, by which the latter, being a stronger department, may be led to support the constitutional rights of the former, without being too much detached from its own legislative functions.[1] And the patronage of the executive has also some tendency to create a counteracting influence in aid of his independence. It is true, that in England an absolute negative is vested in the king, as a branch of the legislative power; and he possesses the absolute power of rejecting, rather than of resolving. And this is thought by Mr. Justice Blackstone and others, to be a most important, and indeed indispensable part of the royal prerogative, to guard against the usurpations of the legislative authority.[2] Yet in point of fact this negative of the king has not been once exercised since the year 1692;[3] a fact, which can only be accounted for upon one of two suppositions, either that the influence of the crown has prevented the passage of objectionable measures, or that the exercise of the prerogative has become so odious, that it has not been deemed safe to exercise it, except upon the most pressing emergencies.[4] Probably both
↑De Lolme on Constitution, ch. 17, p. 390, 391; 1 Kent's Comm. Lect. 11, p. 220.
↑1 Wilson's Law Lect. 448, 419; The Federalist, No. 73; id. No. 69; 1 Kent's Comm. Lect. 11, p. 226.—Mr. Burke, in his letter to the sheriffs of Bristol,[a 1] has treated this subject with his usual masterly power. "The king's negative to bills," says he, "is one of the most undisputed of the royal prerogatives; and it extends to all cases whatsoever. I am
