great sagacity, that men are generally more honest in their private, than in their public capacity; and will go greater lengths to serve a party, than when their own private interest is alone concerned. Honour is a great check upon mankind, but where a considerable body of men act together, this check is in a great measure removed, since a man is sure to be approved of by his own party, for what promotes the common interest; and he soon learns to despise the clamours of adversaries.[1] This is by no means an opinion peculiar to Mr. Hume. It will be found lying at the foundation of the political reasonings of many of the greatest men in all ages, as the result of a close survey of the passions, and infirmities, of the history, and experience of mankind.[2] With a view, therefore, to preserve the rights and liberties of the people against unjust encroachments, and to secure the equal benefits of a free constitution, it is of vital importance to interpose some check against the undue exercise of the legislative power, which in every government is the predominating, and almost irresistible power.[3]
§ 551. This subject is put in a very strong light by an eminent writer,[4] whose mode of reasoning can be- ↑ 1 Hume's Essays, Essay 6; id. Essay 16.—Mr. Jefferson has said, that "the functionaries of public power rarely strengthen in their dispositions to abridge it." 4 Jefferson's Corresp. 277.
- ↑ See 1 Adams's Defence of American Constitution, p. 121, Letter 26, &c.; id. Letter, 24; id. Letter 55; 1 Hume's Essays, Essay 16; 1 Wilson's Law Lect. 394 to 397; 3 Adams's Defence of American Constitution, Letter 6, p. 209, &c.
- ↑ Mr. Hume's thoughts are often striking and convincing; but his mode of a perfect commonwealth[a 1] contains some of the most extravagant vagaries of the human mind, equaled only by Locke's Constitution for Carolina. These examples show the danger of relying implicitly upon the mere speculative opinions of the wisest men.
- ↑ Mr. John Adams.
- ↑ 1 Hume's Essays, Essay 16.
