CH. XIV.]
POWERS OF CONGRESS—TAXES.
411
no expression, in the granting clause, which makes that power exclusive in the Union. There is no independent clause, or sentence, which prohibits the states from exercising it. So far is this from being the case, that a plain and conclusive argument to the contrary is deducible from the restraint laid upon the states, in relation to duties on imports and exports. This restriction implies an admission, that, if it were not inserted, the states would possess the power it excludes; and it implies a further admission, that as to all other taxes the authority of the states remains undiminished. In any other view, it would be both unnecessary and dangerous. It would be unnecessary, because, if the grant to the Union of the power of laying such duties implied the exclusion of the states, or even their subordination in this particular, there would be no need of such a restriction. It would be dangerous, because the introduction of it leads directly to the conclusion, which has been mentioned, and which, if the reasoning of the objectors be just, could not have been intended; I mean, that the states in all cases, to which the restriction did not apply, would have a concurrent power of taxation with the Union. The restriction in question amounts to what lawyers call a negative pregnant; that is, a negation of one thing, and an affirmance of another; a negation of the authority of the states to impose taxes on imports and exports; and an affirmance of their authority to impose them on other articles.
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As to a supposition of repugnancy between the power of taxation in the states, and in the Union; it cannot be supported in that sense, which would be requisite to work
