Page:Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (1st ed, 1833, vol II).djvu/45

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CH. VIII.]
THE LEGISLATURE.
37
laws they make.[1] But it is not less true, that it has a constant tendency to overleap its proper boundaries, from passion, from ambition, from inadvertence, from the prevalence of faction, or from the overwhelming influence of private interests.[2] Under such circumstances, the only effectual barrier against oppression, accidental or intentional, is to separate its operations, to balance interest against interest, ambition against ambition, die combinations and spirit of dominion of one body against the like combinations and spirit of another. And it is obvious, that the more various the elements, which enter into the actual composition of each body, the greater the security will be.[3] Mr. Justice Wilson has truly remarked, that,
when a single legislature is determined to depart from the principles of the constitution, and its uncontrollable power may prompt the determination, there is no constitutional authority to check its progress. It may proceed by long and hasty strides in violating the constitution, till nothing but a revolution can check its career. Far different will the case be, when the legislature consists of two branches. If one of them should depart, or attempt to depart, from the principles of the constitution, it will be drawn back by the other. The very apprehension of the event will prevent the departure, or the attempt.[4]

  1. Sidney's Disc. on Government, ch. 3, § 45.
  2. The Federalist, No. 15.
  3. Id. No. 62, 15.
  4. 1 Wilson's Law Lect. 396; The Federalist, No. 62, 63.—Mr. Jefferson was decidedly in favour of a division of the legislative power into two branches, as will be evident from an examination of his Notes on Virginia, (p. 194,) and his Correspondence at the period, when this subject was much discussed.[a 1] De Lolme, in his work on the constitution of England, has (ch. 3, p. 214, &c.) some very striking remarks on the same subject, in the passage already cited. He has added: "The result of a division of the executive power is either a more or less speedy
  1. 2 Pitk. Hist. 283.