CH. IX.]
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.
67
materially varying the rights of suffrage.[1] So that absolute stability is not to be predicated of the existing modes of suffrage; though there is little practical danger of any changes, which would work unfavourably to popular rights.
§ 586. In the third place, the term of service of representatives. In order to ensure permanent safety to the liberties of the people, other guards are indispensable, besides those, which are derived from the exercise of the right of suffrage and representation. If, when the legislature is once chosen, it is perpetual, or may last during the life of the representatives; and in case of death, or resignation only, the vacancy is to be supplied by the election of new representatives; it is easy to perceive, that in such cases there will be but a very slight check upon their acts, on the part of the people. In such cases, if the legislative body should be once corrupted, the evil would be past all remedy, at least without some violent revolution, or extraordinary calamity.[2] But, when different legislative bodies are to succeed each other at short intervals, if the people disapprove of the present, they may rectify its faults, by the silent exercise of their power in the succeeding election. Besides, a legislative assembly, which is sure to be separated again, and its members soon return to private life, will feel its own interests, as well as duties, bound up with those of the community at large.[3] It may, therefore, be safely laid down, as a fundamental axiom of republican governments, that there must be a dependence on, and responsibility to, the people, on the part of the representative, which shall constantly exert an influence upon
