Page:Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (1st ed, 1833, vol III).djvu/299

This page has been proofread, but needs to be validated.
CH. XXXVI.]
EXECUTIVE—DURATION OF OFFICE.
291

indirectly, disposed of by the vote of eight states against three.[1] The reasoning, which led to this conclusion, is understood to have been that, which has been already stated, and which is most elaborately expounded in the Federalist.[2]

§ 1424. The question as to the unity of the executive being disposed of, the next consideration is, as to the proper duration of his term of office. It has been already mentioned, that duration in office constitutes an essential requisite to the energy of the executive department. This has relation to two objects; first, the personal firmness of the chief magistrate in the employment of his constitutional powers; and, secondly, the stability of the system of administration, which may have been adopted under his auspices. With regard to the first, it is evident, that the longer the duration in office, the greater will be the probability of obtaining so important an advantage. A man will naturally be interested in whatever he possesses, in proportion to the firmness or precariousness of the tenure, by which he holds it. He will be less attached to what he holds by a momentary, or uncertain title, than to what he enjoys by a tide durable, or certain; and of course he will be willing to risk more for the one, than for the other. This remark is not less applicable to political privilege, or honour, or trust, than to any article of ordinary property. A chief magistrate, acting under the consciousness, that in a very short time he must lay down office, will be apt to feel himself too little interested in it to hazard any material censure or perplexity from an independent exercise of his powers, or from those ill hu-
  1. Journ. of Convention, p. 69, 104, 265, 278, 340, 341. See also 2 Amer. Museum, 435, 534, 537.
  2. The Federalist, No. 70; 3 Elliot's Deb. 109.