cation by thought, we are only adding further relations to consciousness; we are only qualifying it further by thought relations Can the theory we are examining avoid such determinations? This brings us to our third question: Can a mere x, an absolutely unrelated object, afford us any ground for asserting the relativity of specific objects in consciousness as they actually exist? If the absolute object is entirely out of relation to consciousness, it certainly cannot be related to feelings, the supposed content of consciousness. Even were it granted that we could know the existence of an unknowable object and know that it was absolute, we should not be justified in saying that our actual feelings were relative; to effect this, the Absolute must be brought into specific relations with specific feelings. As long as its sole characteristic is unrelatedness to consciousness, it and the content of consciousness have nothing to do with each other; and to make one the ground of asserting anything regarding the real nature of the other is absurd. Indeed, not only must specific relations between the object and feelings be asserted, but we find as matter of fact at least one such implicitly posited, viz., that of cause and effect. The absolute object is the cause, the feeling is the effect. Now, remember that by this same theory all knowledge comes from feeling, and then ask how is it possible for the feeling consciousness to know this relation. At most, sensationalism can mean by causation regular succession of feelings; but the characteristics of the supposed cause in this case are precisely that it is not a feeling, and (since it is unknowable) that the succession has never been once observed, but it is only by making this self-destructive assumption that the theory can get the slightest footing.
We conclude on this point, therefore, that, to prove the Relativity of Feeling, it must be assumed that there is an absolute object; that this object must be in consciousness, and specifically related to the content of consciousness, and that these relations cannot be in the way of feeling. We must know that there is such an object; we must know what it is, and the what must consist in its relation to thought. Perhaps a method of stating this conclusion which would appear less formal, though not less expressive of the difficulty, would be to say that whatever is explained must be explained by reference to the known and not the unknown. Even were it admitted, e. g., that the cause of our
