ment by process of law of any judgment of the State which in effect abridged the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, or deprived any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,[1] no matter upon what foundation such a judgment professedly rested.
Is it not a grave misconception to assume that in the absence of appropriate congressional action, under the Fourteenth Amendment, any violation, infringement, or encroachment upon the letter or spirit of that amendment (which is the supreme
law of the land) is not equally void and unconstitutional, whether such violation, encroachment, or infringement necessarily results from the decision of a State court, based upon any customary usage, common-law principle or precedent, in force in such State, or any other prevailing State custom which has the force of law? Is the repudiation of the supreme law of the Fourteenth Amendment upon such grounds more justifiable than if in fact based upon a State statute inhibiting or abridging the rights, privileges, and immunities of the citizens secured by the Fourteenth Amendment?[2] The provisions of section two of article six of the Constitution—which are "that the Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made or which shall be made under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land, and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding"—would seem to demonstrate it to be the sound construction of the Fourteenth Amendment, that, in the absence of congressional action to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, all judgments of State courts which tolerated an infringement of the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment by the act of the individual, of the State or otherwise (although there was no such State law authorizing such encroachment), would be void, as much as if such violation of
