Opinion of the Court
other Courts of Appeals, we granted certiorari to review the Ninth Circuit’s ruling that criminal aliens who are not arrested immediately upon release are thereby exempt from mandatory detention under §1226(c). 583 U. S. ___ (2018). We now reverse.
Opinion of Alito, J.
II
Before addressing the merits of the Court of Appeals’ interpretation, we resolve four questions regarding our jurisdiction to hear these cases.
The first potential hurdle concerns §1226(e), which states:
“The [Secretary’s] discretionary judgment regarding the application of [§1226] shall not be subject to review. No court may set aside any action or decision by the [Secretary] under this section regarding the detention or release of any alien or the grant, revocation, or denial of bond or parole.” (Emphasis added.)
As we have held, this limitation applies only to “discretionary” decisions about the “application” of §1226 to particular cases. It does not block lawsuits over “the extent of the Government’s detention authority under the ‘statutory framework’ as a whole.” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2018) (slip op., at 11–12) (quoting Demore, 538 U. S., at 517). And the general extent of the Government’s authority under §1226(c) is precisely the issue here. Respondents’ argument is not that the Government exercised its statutory authority in an unreasonable fashion. Instead, they dispute the extent of the statutory authority that the Government claims. Because this claim of authority does not constitute a mere “discretionary” “application” of the relevant statute, our review is not barred by §1226(e).
Nor are we stripped of jurisdiction by §1252(b)(9), which provides:
