Opinion of the Court
it? Presumably the–unlike those serving time–are to be detained as they come across the Government’s radar and any relevant evidentiary standards are satisfied.[1])
In short, we read the “when released” directive to apply when there is a release. In other situations, it is simply not relevant. It follows that both of subsection (c)’s mandates–for arrest and for release–apply to any alien linked with a predicate offense identified in subparagraphs (A)–(D), regardless of exactly when or even whether the alien was released from criminal custody.
C
Finally, respondents perch their reading of §1226(c)–unsteadily, as it turns out–on the canon of constitutional avoidance. This canon provides that “[w]hen ‘a serious doubt’ is raised about the constitutionality of an act of Congress, ‘…this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.’ ” Jennings, 583 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 12) (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 62 (1932)).
Respondents say we should be uneasy about endorsing any reading of §1226(c) that would mandate arrest and detention years after aliens’ release from criminal custody–when many aliens will have developed strong ties to the country and a good chance of being allowed to stay if given a hearing. At that point, respondents argue, mandatory detention may be insufficiently linked to public benefits like protecting others against crime and ensuring that aliens will appear at their removal proceedings. In respondents’ view, detention in that scenario would raise
- ↑ See n. 7, supra. Detainees who deny that they satisfy any §1226(c) predicate may challenge their mandatory detention in a Joseph hearing. See Matter of Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. 799 (BIA 1999). See also Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U. S. ___, ___, n. 1 (2018) (slip op., at 5, n. 1).
