Breyer, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 16–1363
KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. MONY PREAP, ET AL.
BRYAN WILCOX, ACTING FIELD OFFICE DIRECTOR, IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. BASSAM YUSUF KHOURY, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[March 19, 2019]
Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Ginsburg, Justice Sotomayor, and Justice Kagan join, dissenting.
A provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U. S. C. §1226(c), focuses upon potentially deportable noncitizens who have committed certain offenses or have ties to terrorism. It requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to take those aliens into custody “when… released” from prison and to hold them without a bail hearing until Government authorities decide whether to deport them. The question is whether this provision limits the class of persons in the “no-bail-hearing” category to only those aliens who were taken into custody “when… released” from prison, or whether it also places in that “no-bail-hearing” category those aliens who were taken into custody years or decades after their release from prison.
The critical statutory language is contained in paragraph (2) of this provision. That paragraph says (with one exception not relevant here) that “an alien described in paragraph (1)” must be held without a bail hearing. Here we must decide what these words mean. Do the words “an
