Page:Kissinger's Trip (2) - November 25-29, 1974(Gerald Ford Library)(1553935).pdf/33

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And they will try to use this point not only to compare with your country but also intimidate countries with only a few nuclear weapons and thus reach their aim of hegemony.

So our overall view of such treaties is that we attach importance to their political significance, and as always our attitude toward such matters is that we believe they are not of much consequence, and we are not bound by any such treaty or agreement. And as the Doctor has repeated many times, your aim is not to bind others either.

Kissinger: In every meeting with the Soviet Union in discussing proposals directed against China such as nuclear testing and nuclear proliferation, we have always avoided formulations whose purpose is directed against third countries.

Teng: But even if they were so, even if they succeeded, what role would those treaties play? They would not be able to play much of a role. And if they signed such agreements, they would still be waving their baton, and if they don't sign they would still have nuclear weapons. As for our nuclear weapons, as Chairman Mao says, they are only so much [gesturing with fingers].

Kissinger: We have never discussed nuclear weapons with you from our side.

Teng: That is right.

Kissinger: We inform you of Soviet overtures not because you should pay attention but because if they should ever tell you, you will know what is happening. ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• And so we inform you of things with them whether you attach significance to them or not. And we are not asking you to do anything about it.

There is one other matter that came up in Vladivostok that I wanted to mention to you. The Soviet proposed to us to have consultations on Japanese-Chinese relations and to prevent them from becoming too close. We have refused this, and we have told the Japanese in a general way about this, and have told the Japanese about our refusal.

Teng: So from this too we can see the aims of the Soviet Union. You know, their Foreign Minister, Mr. Gromyko, has a characteristic of which we were told by Khrushchev in 1957 when Chairman Mao went to Moscow.

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