Kissinger: I do not believe now that the Syrians were provocative. I think Israel is trying to provoke so they can justify the arms. Rabin wants to show Arab bellicosity so Israel can sit back at the end of an assured U.S. arms supply.
Schlesinger: Jordan was worried about Syria.
Kissinger: Don't get me wrong -- over the next year they'll be a problem, yes, but not right now. The Syrians were willing to make another small step and not insist on the '67 borders in the next move. If we could get a third of the Golan, we could get two-to-three years. But the problem is the Israeli settlements. No Israeli Government would agree to move them. We would have to threaten a cutoff of everything and order it.
I think there will be no war this fall, but there is a 50-50 chance of one by next summer. The Egyptians are on the verge of copping out. But one more move and they would be out of the game. We can get one extension of UNDOF but not more.
We can't commit the billion until we get an Israeli agreement on the route of March.
Can we get an assessment of the forces?
Scowcroft: They are a little better off.
Schlesinger: That is right.
Kissinger: I want to talk about SALT for a minute. I want to talk a minute at the SRG. I discussed it with the President. Geneva should talk only general principles. I will ask the Working Group to come up with what the principles would be and start coming up with the numbers. We need maybe two NSC meetings.
Schlesinger: Here are some draft instructions. The delegation should discuss the elements of the balance, the implications of growth and stability.
Kissinger: Yes. In the numbers, over 10 years, could we give them the edge in the totals in return for an edge in MIRVs?
Schlesinger: MIRV's are a lot of crap. The Poseidon doesn't give you much. We test them only against one target.
TOP SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
