Page:Kline v Official Secretary to the Governor General.pdf/13

This page has been proofread, but needs to be validated.

9.

specified tribunal, authority or body "unless the document relates to matters of an administrative nature."

20 It can also be noted that Sched 1 to the FOI Act, entitled "Courts and tribunals exempt in respect of non-administrative matters", exempts three entities from the operation of the Act. Pursuant to s 7, Pt I of Sched 2 lists agencies which are also exempt, and Pt II of Sched 2 lists agencies which are exempt from granting a right of access to particular documents.

The decision of the Tribunal

21 The Tribunal affirmed the decision of the Official Secretary to refuse the appellant access to documents which were the subject of her request. In accordance with an agreement reached between the parties, the Tribunal did not scrutinise the requested documents in detail. The Tribunal noted that if any categories of documents to which the appellant had requested access did not fall within the exception in s 6A(1), it would be necessary to consider at a further hearing whether such documents were exempt from disclosure by reference to some other provision of the FOI Act. The Tribunal found that the Official Secretary held some documents which fell within the categories the appellant had requested.

22 The Tribunal considered that documents generated in connection with the conferral of honours in the Order related to substantive functions of the Governor-General. Accordingly, as the documents requested "squarely relate[d] to the operation of the system of honours"[1], the Tribunal considered that none of the documents, or categories of documents, related to "matters of an administrative nature" within the meaning of s 6A(1) of the FOI Act. The Tribunal affirmed the decision under review.

The decision of the Full Court

23 The Full Court held that the relevant distinction drawn by s 6A(1) of the FOI Act, between "matters of an administrative nature" and matters which were not of such a nature, reflected a distinction between the substantive powers and functions of the Governor-General and the "apparatus" for the exercise of those powers or functions, which was merely supportive[2]. The Full Court considered


  1. Kline v Official Secretary to the Governor-General (2012) 127 ALD 639 at 644–645 [24].
  2. Kline v Official Secretary to the Governor-General (2012) 208 FCR 89 at 95 [21].