suaded the Korean Government to borrow five million yen in gold and silver bullion at 5½ per cent., giving the Customs revenue as security. M. Cazalis argued that it was necessary to carry the matter through with secresy, because it would have been impossible to procure any signatures to the document, if the affair had been conducted publicly, with the full knowledge of the Chief Commissioner of the Customs. In other words, he admitted that the scheme was such as would never have commended itself to Mr. McLeavy Brown, who was absolutely impartial and without interest in the matter.
In the meantime, it is as well to note that the loan aimed at creating a position for French interests in Korea. In view of the attempt of Russia to acquire an open and ice-free port for her own purposes, and the distinct understanding existing between the French and Russian Governments with regard to Russia's Asiatic policy, Great Britain could not disregard any possible development. At that moment French activity in Korea may not have involved any direct menace to our own interests. Nevertheless, any combination of circumstances which gave to French and Russian influence a predominance in the administration of the country, could scarcely fail to develop incidents, against which it is our manifest duty to guard. And it is perhaps curious, moreover, that the man who was the prime mover in the intrigue to dispossess Mr. McLeavy Brown of his house should have been the very one to arrange the loan from the Yunnan Syndicate with M. Cazalis.
If the wisdom and necessity of a loan of five millions had been assured, there are many directions in Korea in which such a sum could be most profitably spent. With the revenue of the Customs as the guarantee, there would
