force attacking by land would be severely handled by the positions from which the Russians propose to defend their flanks and the neck. At the present, however, there is a paucity of field-guns among the troops in garrison, in addition to which many of the more recently constructed forts lack artillery; while the opinion may be hazarded that the entire position has been so over-fortified as to become a source of eventual weakness in the ultimate disposition of the Russian force.
Of course a fight for the command of the sea will precede any land operations. Japan is within fifteen hours steam of Fusan, already a Japanese garrison-town, and of Ma-san-po, the port to which Russia and Japan make equal claim. The strait separating Japan from Korea is 200 miles broad, while Russia's nearest base at Port Arthur is 900 miles away on one hand and Vladivostock is 1200 miles away on the other. It follows therefore, that in Korea, and not in Manchuria, the troops of the Japanese army would be landed. Once established in Korea, Japan would be able to dispute the supremacy of the sea on equal terms. In this respect the possession by the Japanese of numerous torpedo craft confers a distinct advantage upon them, since it will be within their power to utilise their services if the Russian fleet were to attempt to check the movement. The absence of any facilities for repairing damages makes it certain that so far as possible the Russian fleet will evade any serious engagement. It would be difficult to improve upon the position of Japan in this respect. At Yokosuka, from which place a large number of cruisers have been launched, there is a very extensive building-yard, and Japan also possesses suitable docks for large ships at Kure and Nagasaki. In all she has at her immediate disposal some half a dozen docks,
