Thomas, J., concurring
“any right I may have to file a lawsuit or other civil action or proceeding relating to my employment with the Company” (emphasis added)); ibid. (“The Company and I mutually consent to the resolution by arbitration of all claims… that I may have against the Company” (emphasis added)); id., at 24a–25a (“Specifically, the Company and I mutually consent to the resolution by arbitration of all claims that may hereafter arise in connection with my employment” (emphasis added)). This agreement provides no “contractual basis” for concluding that the parties agreed to class arbitration, Stolt-Nielsen, supra, at 684, and I would therefore reverse on that basis.
The Court instead evaluates whether California’s contra proferentem rule, as applied here, “‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives’ of the FAA.” Ante, at 6 (quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U. S. 333, 352 (2011)). I remain skeptical of this Court’s implied pre-emption precedents, see Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U. S. 555, 582–604 (2009) (opinion concurring in judgment), but I join the opinion of the Court because it correctly applies our FAA precedents, see Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U. S. ___ (2018); Concepcion, supra.
guage, that an arbitration agreement did not authorize class arbitration. See Nelsen v. Legacy Partners Residential, Inc., 207 Cal. App. 4th 1115, 1129–1131, 144 Cal. Rptr. 3d 198, 210–211 (2012); Kinecta Alternative Financial Solutions, Inc. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles Cty., 205 Cal. App. 4th 506, 517–519, 140 Cal. Rptr. 3d 347, 356–357 (2012), disapproved of on other grounds by Sandquist v. Lebo Automotive, Inc., 1 Cal. 5th 233, 376 P. 3d 506 (2016).
