Kagan, J., dissenting
of the interpretive dispute—for allowing, but also for barring, class arbitration. You are then in the majority’s position, “accept[ing]” the arbitration agreement as “ambiguous.” Ante, at 5. What should follow?
Under California law (which applies unless preempted) the answer is clear: The agreement must be read to authorize class arbitration. That is because California—like every other State in the country—applies a default rule construing “ambiguities” in contracts “against their drafters.” Sandquist, 1 Cal. 5th, at 247, 376 P. 3d, at 514; see Cal. Civ. Code Ann. §1654 (West 2011); see also Brief for Contract Law Scholars as Amici Curiae 10–12, and n. 4 (listing decisions from all 50 States applying that rule). This anti-drafter canon—which “applies with peculiar force” to form contracts like Lamps Plus’s—promotes clarity in contracting by resolving ambiguities against the party who held the pen. Sandquist, 1 Cal. 5th, at 248, 376 P. 3d, at 514 (quoting Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 28 Cal. 3d 807, 819, n. 16, 623 P. 2d 165, 172, n. 16 (1981)); see Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts, 99 Yale L. J. 87, 91, 105, n. 80 (1989). And the rule makes quick work of interpreting the arbitration agreement here. Lamps Plus drafted the agreement. It therefore had the opportunity to insert language expressly barring class arbitration if that was what it wanted. It did not do so. It instead (at best) left an ambiguity about the availability of class arbitration. So California law holds that Lamps Plus cannot now claim the benefit of the doubt as to the agreement’s meaning. Even the majority does not dispute that point. See ante, at 5, 9.
And contrary to the rest of the majority’s opinion,[1] the FAA contemplates that such a state contract rule will control the interpretation of arbitration agreements.
- ↑ I say “the majority’s,” but although five Justices have joined today’s opinion, only four embrace its reasoning. See n. 8, infra.
