Page:Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion volume 3.djvu/277

which penetrates the imperfection of the form and exercises its power; or rather, we might say, it is itself the real and substantial force. The religious elevation of the soul to God consequently recognises itself in that expression of the truth, imperfect as it is, and is aware of its inner and true meaning, and so protects itself against the syllogism of the Understanding and its methods which stunt this true meaning. That is why, as Kant says (in the place already referred to, p. 632), “this method of proof undoubtedly most readily carries persuasion with it, not only for the ordinary understanding, but for the speculative understanding too; and it obviously contains, too, the main lines on which all the proofs of natural theology are based, and which have at all times been followed, and will be still further followed, however much people may try to trick them out and conceal them under all sorts of fancy embellishments;” and, I add, it is possible by following the Understanding entirely to miss the meaning of the substantial element contained in these great fundamental lines of argument, and to imagine they have been formally refuted by the critical understanding, or, it may be, in virtue of the want of understanding as well as the want of reason characteristic of so-called immediate knowledge, politely to throw these arguments on one side unrefuted or to ignore them.