Page:Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion volume 3.djvu/358

third thing through which the final-end of the world will be realised. This is an absolute postulate. Moral good belongs essentially to Man; but since his power is finite, and since the realisation of the Good in him is limited owing to the natural element attaching to him, since, in fact, he is himself the enemy of the Good, it is not within his power to realise it. The existence of God is here conceived of simply as a postulate, as something that should be, and which should have for Man subjective certainty, because the Good represents what is ultimate in his reason. But this certainty is merely subjective; it remains merely a belief, an ideal, and it cannot be shown that it actually exists. Aye, if the Good is to be really moral and present, then we should have to go the length of requiring and presupposing the perpetual existence of the discord, for moral Good can only exist and can only be in so far as it is in conflict with evil. It would thus be necessary to postulate the perpetual existence of the enemy, of what is opposed to the Good. If, then, we turn to the content, we find it to be limited; and if we go on to the supreme end, we find ourselves in another region, where we start from what is inward, not from what is actually present and supplied by experience. If, on the other hand, we start from experience, the Good, the final-end is something subjective merely, and in this case the contradiction between Man’s finite life and the Good would have to exist always.