�This Page Declassified lAW EO12958 4 -- USAF ?mSwOa[CAr. S?VD?S bills, but the Army Reorganization Act of 1920 gave statutory recognition to the Air Service and made it a regular combatant arm of the Army, though it did not change the existing relationship between the Air Service and the General Staff. The act really n:?_]ll._?ed progress toward separate cabinet status for the air arm by abolish- ing the office of Assistant Secretary oœ War [for Air] and many aviators considered ?t a definite setback for Air Service aspira- tions. It marked the victory of the old order in m?Htary circles over the proponents of a separate air force. =? The leader of the fight for an independ- ent air force was Brig. Gert. William Mitch- ell, Assistant Chief of the Air Service from 1919 to 1925. Mitchell's views on the importance of air power in modern warfare were not shared by his superiors in the Army, but he campaigned with unquench- able zeal for a strong, independent air force. Mitchell appeared before congres- sional connmttees and special aircraft boards, engaged in lecture tours, and wrote books in order to bring home to the public the Importance of air power.* Mitchell's doctrines were also largely re- sponsible for the heated debate between the Army Air Service and the Navy over the question of the effectiveness of aerial bombardment of naval vessels. To demon- strate the power of aerial bombardment, obsolete Amerlcau battleships and some captured German naval vessels were used as bomb targets by Army Air Service planes in a series of tests made off the Atlantic Coast. These tests proved conclusively, to . Mitcheli at least, that battleships were vul- nerable to aerial attack. ? The publication of Mitchell's report on the si?iug of the captured German battleship Ostfrieslancl in one of the bombing tests raised a tremen- dous furor. This report, supposedly safely pigeonholed, tore the official report of the Joint Army and Navy Board to pieces and blasted the claims of the admirals that the bombing tests had proved nothing and that battleships would still remain the greatest
- ?ee wJlHftm MitehaH, Our Ale Force: ?eyst?ae of
]Defemm (?ew ?ork, 19?1); a?d Winged Defense' ?e Devdop- ?tt? ?ndon s?d ?ew ?crk, factor in naval strength. As a result, Gen- eral Menoher, Director of the Air Service, resigned; and the Senate passed a resolu- tion calling on the S?cretary of War to sub- mit General Mitchell's report to that body. Acting on the President's iustructions, the Secretary of War refused to submit the report. Despite criticism, this report was never officially released. e-? General Mitchell's contfmued crusade in favor of airpower? and his outspoken criti- cism of those who were opposed to its de- velopment, brought about his dismissal as Assistant Chief of the Air Service, and eventually a court-martial in 1925. By sen- ?enee of the court martial he was suspended from rank, command, and duty, with a œor- reitufo of all pay and allowances for five years. Soon afte?w?ard he resigned his com- mission but kept up his fight for air power. Mitchell's crusade for a separate air force, and his "martyrdom," had a great ?mpact on public opinion. The numerous Mitchell headlines in the newspapers tended to swell the mailbags of members of Con- gress and to produce flutries of "Mitchell Resolutions." Most of these resolutions died in committee, but they served as a nucleus for subsequent important legislation. ? Such legislation was to be long delayed, however. The older officers of the Army and Navy did not share the view of the Air Service flying officers whose experi- ence in World War I had convinced them that warfare in the future would be increas- ingly dependent on air power, and that air power was a striking arm which should con- stitute a third branch of our military establishment on an equal status with the land and sea branches. High-ranking digni? taries, including the heads of the War and Navy Departments, members of the Gen- eral Staff, and others in responsible posi. tions of leadership, regarded aviation shn- ply az an auxiliary to Army and Navy operations, not as a separate element of the military establishment. As they wished to keep aviation in a subordinate or auxiliary role, they opposed any movement to in- crease the potation, power, or prestige of the air arm. ? Occupying positions of domi- nance and control, this group had a great THIS PAGE Declassified lAW EO12958
