now one object, then another Kautsky has accidentally stumbled here on one true idea, namely, that dictatorship is a power which is not bound by any laws; nevertheless, he still fails to give us a definition of dictatorship, and in addition, utters an obvious historical falsehood, viz., that dictatorship means the power of one person. This is not even literally correct, since the power of dictatorship can be exercised also by a handful of persons, by an oligarchy, by one class, etc.
Kautsky further points out the difference between dictatorship and despotism, but although what he says is obviously incorrect, we shall not dwell upon it, as it is wholly irrelevant to the main subject. Everybody knows Kautsky’s weakness in turning his face from the twentieth to the eighteenth century, and from the eighteenth century to classical antiquity, and I hope that the German proletariat, having established its dictatorship, may take cognizance of this amiable habit of his and appoint him to the post of master of ancient history at some boys' secondary school. To try to evade a definition of the dictatorship of the proletariat by scholastic disquisitions on despotism is either sheer stupidity or a very clumsy trick.
As a result, we find that having undertaken to discuss the dictatorship of the proletariat, Kautsky has talked a good deal that is contrary to truth, but has given us no definition. Yet he could, without relying upon his ingenuity, have had recourse to his memory and taken out from his pigeon-holes all those instances when Marx spoke of the dictatorship. He would certainly have arrived, roughly, at the following definition: Dictatorship is an authority relying directly upon force, and not bound by any laws. The revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat is an authority maintained by the proletariat by means of force over and against the bourgeoisie, and not bound by any laws.
And this simple truth—plain as noonday to every in-
( 15 )
