any further expropriation of capital. We are considering here the question of changing the basis of our economic and political structure. Heretofore, measures for the immediate expropriation of the expropriators were preeminent. At present preeminence must be given to the organization of accounting and control in those enterprises in which the capitalists have already been expropriated.
Were we to attempt now to continue the expropriation of capital at the same rate as heretofore, we would surely be defeated. It is clear to every thinking person that our work of organizing proletarian accounting and control has not kept pace with the work of the direct "expropriation of the expropriators." If we now turn all our efforts to organizing accounting and control, we shall be able to solve this problem; we shall overcome our shortcomings and win our "campaign" against capitalism.
But is not the admission that we have difficulties to overcome equivalent to an admission that some mistakes have been made? Not at all. We will again use a military example. If the enemy can be defeated and forced back by the use of light cavalry only, this should be done. And if this can be done successfully only up to a certain line, it is quite conceivable that beyond this line it becomes necessary to bring up the heavy artillery. Admitting that it is now necessary to overcome our difficulties by bringing up the heavy artillery, we do not admit that the victorious cavalry attack was a mistake.
We have been frequently reproached by the servants of the bourgeois for conducting a "Red Guard" attack on capitalism. An absurd reproach, worthy indeed of servants of the money pouch! The "Red Guard" attack on capitalism was at that time absolutely dictated by the circumstances: first, capitalists were offering military resistance through Kerensky and Kransnov, Savinkov and Gotz (Gegechkori is even now offering such resistance), Dutov
