378 TO THE BRAZILIAN FRONT.
His friendsj however,, reply that if slow he is sure ; and that he has never failed in the long run to succeed. Again^ he is charged with great arrogance^ and with being a hater of foreigners. His entourage of mediocrities is accounted for by his wishing to stand alone in his glory ; he objects to be supplied with brains^ as Marshal Pelissier was with General de Martinprey. Doubts have lately been cast upon his personal gallantry^ but these, I believe, are simply hostile inventions. He aj)pears to want initiative, the power of sudden action ; and amongst the Paraguayans he was famed for selecting the strongest point to attack. The principal merit of the " Wellington of South America " is that of being an excellent organizer. Before he took charge, the Brazilian army was in the worst possible condi- tion ; now it can compare favourably as regards the appli- ances of civilization with the most civilized.
The Commander-in-Chief remarked that the strength of the country, and the temerity of the enemy, had made the campagna a war sui genei'is, an affair of earthworks, a succession of sieges, and not " des sieges a Veau de rose.'* He compared the difficulties of obtaining transport with those of our march from Silistria, and he assured me that the Brazilians had lost by cholera four hundred men in one day. He estimated his disposable men (July 31) at 28,000 — the general opinion being 35,000. The Paraguayans might be 14,000, which the chief engineer reduced to 12,000. General Gelly i Obes increased the total to 15,000, and was followed by the Standard; whilst General Urquiza said 20,000 — probably the most correct estimate. He repeated what I had often heard, namely, that the Paraguayan bull- dogs, who fight so fanatically for their Marshal-President, and who die rather than accept quarter, when once made prisoners, and well treated, generally volunteer to serve against El Supremo ; adding that he preferred deporting
