lations. If Texas should be spurned from the embrace of the United States, he was for placing the Republic in such an attitude that she might fall back upon a treaty with a powerful ally. Texas could thus claim protection from her foe, and might advance rapidly to power under a policy made liberal by interest. The extract is as follows: "The United States having taken no definite action in this matter, and there being now an increased prospect of an adjustment of our difficulties with Mexico, the Preside n deems it advisable to take no further action at present in reference to annexation, but has decided to await the issue of events now in progress, and to postpone that subject for future consideration and for such action as circumstances may hereafter render most expedient for the interests of the country."
Gen. Houston's negotiations with the Washington Cabinet caused some little jealousy with the English and French Ministers resident in Texas. Not regarding it probable that a treaty of annexation would soon be consummated, he instructed Mr. Van Zandt to defer all further action for the time being. The following extracts from instructions forwarded to Mr. Van Zandt December 13, 1843, will set forth the reasons for Houston's policy:
"The interposition of foreign friendly governments, by which an armistice has been established between Texas and Mexico, and the prospects ot a permanent peace with that power given, has been extended by the particular governments mostly influential in obtaining these most desirable results, chiefly with a view that in the event of Mexico's agreeing to acknowledge the independence of Texas, she should continue to exist as a separate and independent nation. The great object and desire of Texas is the establishment of a permanent and satisfactory peace with her enemy, and for this purpose the good offices of these powers have been asked and obtained, and the object sought for, through their intervention, appears now on the eve of being realized.
"This intervention and these good offices have been gratuitously and unconditionally given, and although Texas is entirely free to pursue any course she may please in future, the President thinks that, in the present state of our foreign relations, it would not be politic to abandon the expectations which now exist of a speedy settlement of our difficulties with Mexico through the good offices of other powers, for the very uncertain prospect of annexation to the United States, however desirable that event, if it could be consummated, might be. Were Texas to agree to a treaty of annexation, the good offices of these powers would, it is believed, be immediately withdrawn, and were the treaty then to fail of ratifkation by the Senate of the United States, Texas would be placed in a much worse situation than she is at present, nor could she again ask or hope for any interposition on her behalf, either by England or France; and without our consequent supposed dependence upon the United States, might again return to the apathy and indifference towards us which have always until now characterized that government. Texas would then be left in the same situation she was two years since, without a friend, and her difficulties unsettled.
