and destitution. The lessons of prudence and economy which experience has inculcated should not be lost, but rendered available, that some of the evils incurred may be remedied whilst others may be averted.
Although we have an enemy upon our frontier, and are not in a situation to retaliate in such manner as our disposition would urge us to do, and to carry war into their territory; yet, if our resources are carefully economized and properly employed we can render their predatory warfare harmless. Instead of permitting ourselves to be excited and irritated, so as to vanquish ourselves by disorderly rallies to the frontiers, we have it in our power to maintain a force sufficient, under regular discipline, to secure us against serious aggression, and deter the enemy from repeated incursions. As it has hitherto been, the people have rushed to the frontier on the first alarm given of the enemy's approach. A want of discipline and subordination was the consequence; and after consuming the substance of the frontier settlers, they have returned to their homes, leaving behind them an exhausted country; and, for the want of order and discipline, have permitted the enemy to escape without chastisement.
When alarms have been given, instead of apprising the Executive, through the department of war by express, and giving notice to the several counties on the frontier, whose duty it was to hold their militia in instant readiness, they have appealed directly to the citizens and invoked their aid, with whom concert of action could not be expected. The consequence was, that the Executive, upon the receipt of this irregular information, issued the proper orders; but owing to the delays incident to a want of effective organization in the militia, celerity could not be given to the movements required; and the enemy, after having produced great excitement, effected their retreat. These circumstances caused a campaign to be projected by individuals, not functionaries of Government, without first having obtained the advice and sanction of the Executive—they pledging ample supplies for those who should engage in the campaign to the Rio Grande. Whatever the opinions of the Executive under these circumstances may have been, aware that the opinion prevailed that it was practicable by private means, to conduct a campaign, and having ordered out such of the militia as would have it in their power to reach the frontier before the season would be too far advanced to meet the emergency which had but recently existed, he determined to give all the aid, efficiency, and direction to the patriotic ardor of the people that the means in his power would permit. But it is impossible that campaigns can be either projected or conducted with success or advantage to the country, unless under the auspices of the Government. Individuals can not know the situation of our relations, either foreign or domestic. A campaign may be designed by the Government for the purpose of effecting a particular object; for instance, a surprise of the enemy. It may require all the resources of the country, the greatest secrecy, and that the whole force of the country should be in readiness to act in concert so as to effect the design. If individuals assume the right of projecting campaigns, they are liable, not only to thwart the designs of the Government, but, by a diversion of a portion of its means, bring on disaster and insure the greatest calamities to the country Indeed, it has not been unfrequent upon the frontier to project and conduct campaigns without reporting to the proper department any fact or circumstances connected with them from beginning to end. PjdHc stores and munitions of
