Are there not many things contingent on the confirmation of the nominations here made? I suppose, when some individuals were taken off, it was said to them, " My dear fellows, be contented; do not be anxious; do not be like these rude men, these noisy fellows around h re; we will take care of you; you will be provided for." If a midshipman is wanted, they say they can not do anything until we confirm the nominations sent to the Senate. On that hangs everything. There is an influence which is now suspended over the Senate, and over the destiny of this nation. Is it not tremendous? With the patronage of the Government this is a Herculean influence—one dangerous to the liberties of the country. All these appliances are to be brought to bear upon us. Sir, I shall resist them, and I indorse the expression of my friend from Georgia [Mr. Iverson], who said that he would rot in his seat before he would ever vote for the confirmation of one of these nominations, until justice shall be awarded to the officers who have been wronged.
It is very strange that the venerable Senator from Delaware should have referred to Jefferson's action in the reduction of the navy about 1801, when it was determined that he should retain but nine captains. I do not recollect the particulars of the case, but he was to retain a certain number. Mr. Jefferson retained two more. It is said, however, that he reduced the navy at his own option. True; but Congress had passed a law for that purpose, and Mr. Jefferson did nothing selfish in the matter; he acted for the good of the country. He used a large discretion, because he retained two more officers than were provided for in the law. There is a discrepancy between the record and the law, but the inference is that Mr. Jefferson deemed it indispensable to the service, and exercised a discretion which had been through courtesy awarded to him.
I come now to the case of Captain Stribling. I have no disposition to assail any gentleman; but he has obtruded himself here. He was a member of the board, and I hold him accountable, as I do its other members, for its action; but let us see whether his conduct comes up to the standard necessary to determine the merits of others. When 1 last spoke on this subject I charged him with one fact, on the evidence furnished me by an official record—the report of the inspecting officers at New York. I only read a report, and fairly commented on it. He rendered an excuse, which I also read. What did it amount to? Nothing—less than nothing. It was no apology; and yet the Secretary of the Navy was perfectly willing to receive it—in the way in which it was intended—as a blind. If any man of common-sense—any sailor will compare the facts reported there with the duties of an officer, he will be satisfied that Captain Stribling did not discharge his duty as an officer ought to have done; and that his ship was neither in an efficient condition nor in proper order to sustain the honor of the country's flag, if it had been assailed. The ship might have been sunk before he could discharge a gun.
How is it with Captain Pendergrast? I was struck with the analogy between what both Captain Pendergrast and Captain Stribling alleged as reasons for the condition of their ships. I will show here—and any person will find it who chooses to examine the explanation given by Captain Pendergrast when he was in charge of the Saranac in the West Indies—that he does not deny one solitary fact. He breaks out in expressions implicating Lieutenant May, but does not answer a solitary charge which is brought against him; nor does he explain his
